We draw on quantitative and descriptive data from Robert Campbell's widely cited manual for prospective apprentices, The London Tradesman (1747), to demonstrate the responsiveness of apprenticeship in mid-eighteenth century London to market forces of supply and demand. We regress apprenticeship premiums on journeymen's wages, set up costs and a selection of employment conditions and requirements across 178 trades, and find a significant elasticity of 0.4 with respect to wages and 0.25 with respect to set-up costs. We interpret this as supporting an economic model that views premiums as bounded from above by the expected benefits of acquiring the skills of the trade (Lane, 1996); bounded from below by the expected net training costs to the master, taking into account the possibility of the apprentice terminating his service prematurely (Wallis, 2008); and reflecting the relative bargaining power of master and parent. This supports the thesis that apprenticeship played an important role in adapting the English workforce to the skill requirements of the Industrial Revolution.
Introduction
The success of the Industrial Revolution in England was made possible by a largescale redistribution of labor from agricultural employment to industrial and other nonagricultural employment, and growing specialization in manufacturing (Thomas and McCloskey, 1981; Crafts, 1985) . The role played by the long-standing English system of apprenticeship, with its medieval roots, in this process of structural change has been the subject of some historical debate. A critical tradition dating back at least to Adam Smith (1776) views apprenticeship primarily as a tool used by the craft guilds to maintain control over their respective occupations and exclude competition (Ogilvie, 2004; Rothschild, 2001 ). However, this view has been challenged over the last two decades by studies that highlight its important economic contribution to innovation (Epstein, 1998; Mokyr, 2009) and to labor mobility (Humphries, 2003 (Humphries, , 2009 Wallis, 2008) . As Humphries (2003; 2011, Ch. 9) shows in detail, the English system of apprenticeship contributed to the reallocation of labor by providing efficient training in skills directly relevant to the expanding branches of industry; by reducing transaction costs; and by easing liquidity barriers, thus enabling wider participation in the skilled industrial workforce. 1 The present paper continues in this vein, drawing on quantitative and descriptive data from a unique source, Robert Campbell's widely cited manual, The London Tradesman, first published in 1747, 2 which provides explicit quantitative information on the economic conditions of employment and on the terms and requirements of apprenticeship for a detailed classification of trades. We use this data to demonstrate through regression analysis that the variation across trades in the tuition or premium that parents paid masters for their sons' apprenticeships were shaped by economic conditions, its level bounded from above by the expected benefits to the apprentice of acquiring the skills of the trade (Lane, 1996, p. 29) ; bounded from below by the expected net training costs to the master, taking into account the delay before the 1 Its role was especially important in the earlier years of the Industrial Revolution considered here. In her analysis of 600 working-class biographies, Humphries (2011, Table 9 .1) finds that in her earliest group of cohorts, born between 1627 and 1790, at least two thirds and possibly as many as three quarters were apprenticed. In her latest cohort, born in the second half of the 19 th century, this proportion falls to no more than 40% and perhaps as little as a quarter. apprentice becomes reasonably productive and the positive probability of the apprentice leaving prematurely (Wallis, 2008) ; and reflecting the relative bargaining power of master and parent. This paper demonstrates that by the mid-eighteenth century, in London, the medieval institution of apprenticeship had developed a responsiveness to the market forces of supply and demand, which enabled it to play an important role in adapting the English workforce to the changing skill requirements of the Industrial Revolution. This not only facilitated the "premature exodus of labor out of agriculture that [was] the hallmark of British exceptionalism" (Humphries, 2003, p. 99) but allowed sons to migrate out of their fathers' trades when these seemed to suffer from over-crowding or declining demand.
In addition, by establishing the internal consistency of Campbell's observations as a basis for quantitative analysis and demonstrating their consistency with other available data sources, our findings should encourage the wider use of this unique source in understanding of the early stages of England's Industrial Revolution.
Campbell's manual is well-known to historians studying the formation of industrial skills in eighteenth-century England, and frequently cited, however, as far as we know his detailed, trade-specific evidence on wages has not previously been incorporated in quantitative analyses of this period. As far as we know there are no alternative sources on trade-specific wages of comparable breadth and detail for eighteenth century England. 3 Our theoretical analysis of the economic factors that shape apprenticeship premiums follows Wallis (2008) and Minns and Wallis (2013) in taking as its point of departure the hypothesis that "premium size served to mediate the likelihood of early departure among apprentices." The master bore a greater net cost of instruction-and the apprentice reaped greater net benefit-in the early years of the apprenticeship, anticipating that this advantage would be reversed in its later years when the apprentice became more skilled. These costs included the room and board that was generally provided, 4 the value of the master's time, and the cost of wasted or pilfered materials. Premiums were necessary to guard the master against the possible but unforeseeable eventuality that an apprentice might leave before making good the master's initial investment.
Building on their seminal effort, we identify factors associated with the minimal premium that the master of a specific trade would be willing to accept from an apprentice; with the maximal premium that parents would be willing to pay for an apprenticeship in that trade; and with their relative bargaining power. We hypothesize that the master's minimal acceptable premium is positively associated with factors that increase the likelihood of early departure, such as the opportunity cost to the apprentice of further time spent in the master's employ; and factors that delay the point at which the apprentice becomes productive, notably the complexity of the trade. Parents' willingness to pay, on the other hand, is positively associated with the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of the trade that is to be acquired. 5 We further posit that the market for apprenticeships in mid-eighteenth century London is competitive except in trades in which high set-up costs limit masters' entry and allow them some market power. Humphries (2011, Ch. 9) recounts repeated instances of fathers using their extended family and trade contacts to "shop around" for a suitable apprenticeship for their sons within their means. Parents apprenticing their children were often credit-constrained and therefore more sensitive to the level of the premium than masters, who would be more concerned with the child's character and abilities. This suggests that premiums levels should more closely follow the expected net costs of apprenticeship to the master, except possibly where high set-up costs allow masters to command a greater share of the surplus-the difference between the smallest premium masters are willing to accept and the highest premium parents are willing to pay. This is the conceptual framework for our empirical analysis of 178 of the different trades Campbell describes. 6 For each of these trades, Campbell provides quantitative room and board and supervision in loco parentis reduced the transaction costs, especially for apprentices migrating from rural to urban areas. data on the range of premiums paid, and on the range of journeymen's wages and of set-up costs for the master. In addition, he provides qualitative descriptions of each trade, setting out special conditions of employment, such as health hazards; prior training requirements, such as language skills; and personal qualities needed to succeed in the trade such as literacy, physical strength or artistic ability, which we have coded. We regress apprenticeship premiums on journeymen wages, set-up costs and a set of indicator variables that describe the qualitative requirements of the various trades. This complements Minns and Wallis' (2013) empirical analysis of individual apprenticeship contracts, which focuses on the personal circumstances of apprentice and master: the apprentice's age, his geographic origins and his father's occupational background as well as the master's prior experience with apprentices and his association with a guild. Our focus is on the economic and technical attributes of the different trades.
From the master's point of view, journeymen wages are a measure of the opportunity cost of the apprentice's time and hence an indication of the probability of early departure, suggesting a positive association with premium levels. From the parent's point of view we interpret journeymen wages as an indication of the pecuniary benefits of the trade, and as such should also be positively associated with parents' willingness to pay higher premiums. We interpret high set-up costs as indicating a more complex trade and hence a longer and more expensive gestation period until the apprentice becomes reasonably productive. This raises the expected net costs of apprenticeship for the master, implying a positive association with tuition. We also view high set-up costs as a barrier to entry for masters and hence as an indicator of the master's market power vis-à-vis parents, suggesting a further reason for a positive association with tuition levels. Specialized skills are viewed as indicators of the complexity of the trade, and hence of a longer delay until the apprentice is productive, leading masters to demand a higher premium. From the parent's point of view they indicate non-pecuniary benefits such as social status and the quality of the work environment, which should raise their willingness to pay. Trades requiring bodily strength indicate the opposite: they are more easily learned, impart lower status and indicate a more arduous profession, all of which point to lower premiums.
include trades with insufficient information for the purpose of our analysis as well as all shop-keeping trades and liberal professions. We expand on this in our description of the data.
indicator variables that describe skill requirements across 178 trades we find substantial and significant positive effects of both journeymen wages and set-up costs on premiums, with an elasticity of about .40 for wages and 0.25 for set-up costs. We also find significant positive effects for trades requiring artistic talent and prior literacy, and a significant negative effect for trades requiring physical strength.
In the next section we provide some brief background on Campbell's unique manual for aspiring London tradesmen. Section 3 then describes the data we have drawn from it, and compares it to data from other sources; Section 4 presents our regression analyses; and Section 5 concludes.
Apprenticeship manuals: The London Tradesman
Apprenticeship was the main formal system for acquiring skills in eighteenth century England. While its general structure can be traced back to the practices of guilds and cities in the Middle Ages, it was first regulated nationwide in 1563 in the Statute of Artificers which legally determined the core of English apprenticeship contracts (indentures).
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It involved a written contract binding master and apprentice for a prespecified period, usually of seven years, during which the master undertook to teach the apprentice and introduce him to the modus operandi of his trade, provide him with board and lodging and safeguard his moral welfare. Apprentices were under the quasiparental authority of their masters: their manners, entertainment, and freedom to marry were limited. The apprentice, on his part, took it upon himself "duly and truly to serve"; and a premium or cash payment was commonly paid to the master at the beginning of the apprenticeship.
A considerable number of manuals providing guidance and advice to young apprentices began to appear in print from the early seventeenth century (Lane, 1996, p. 164) . The advice in these manuals concentrated particularly on the child's dutiful relationship with the master and the host family. The manual we focus on here 7 The act, although devised by central government, was administered almost entirely by local guilds. The clauses of the Statute limited masters to no more than three apprentices each; stipulated a minimal term of seven years; and required a written indenture for private apprenticeship. The Poor Law Act of 1597 gave Overseers of the Poor and Churchwardens the power to put out to pauper apprenticeships children who could not be cared for by their own family, thus reducing the poor rate in their parish.
concentrates on advice to parents in their decision on a trade for their child. (Campbell, 1747, p. 242) In an appendix, Campbell presents each of the occupations in a table, noting the Company it belongs to and whether it is a Livery Company; the range of premiums 8 We are not aware of any other editions of Campbell's manual. 9 As Lane (1996) points out, the very existence of manuals such as Campbell's is in itself a strong indication that parents considered future earning potential in choosing a trade for their children. required for an apprenticeship; working hours; and the range of set-up costs required of a master.
Campbell surveys in his manual over 300 occupations, most of them in some depth, others more briefly, often noting of the latter that they have no demand for apprentices or that their conditions are very similar to those of another trade described more fully elsewhere. The quantitative information he provides on the conditions of employment and on the terms and requirements of apprenticeship for a detailed classification of trades is unparalleled for eighteenth-century England, and all the more so because it comes from the systematic observations of a single source. We have extensive Stamp Tax records on apprenticeship premiums paid to masters but nothing of similar scope and detail on journeymen wages or on the costs of setting up as a master in different trades.
In the following section we assess the accuracy of Campbell's data by verifying its external consistency with Stamp Tax data on apprenticeship premiums and with what other information we have on trade-specific wages and on setting up costs in mideighteenth century England. Though we know hardly anything about the author, his motives, or the circumstances in which the manual was written, these comparisons indicate, as far as they can, that Campbell conducted a thorough and careful investigation. 
The Data
Of the 300 and some trades that Campbell surveys in his manual, we omit trades that do not take apprentices; trades for which Campbell fails to provide information on premiums, journeymen wages, and set-up costs; and shop-keeping trades that chiefly train apprentices in general book-keeping and related skills. We grouped the remaining 178 trades by occupational groups for the purpose of presenting summary data in Table 1 (no use is made of these groupings in our regression analysis). It presents mid-point values of the ranges provided by Campbell for journeymen wages, premiums and setting up costs, by occupational groups, as well as the coefficient of variation within each group (the standard deviation divided by the mid-point value).
In the appendix we provide a full tabulation of the data for each of these 178 trades, with their assignment to occupational groups (Table A1) . Other weavers earned considerably, with the lowest wages earned by narrow weavers (weavers of ribbons, livery-lace, tapes, incles) who earned around 9 shillings per week and the weavers of simple carpets who earned less than 7 shillings a week. "Other manufactures" include both high wage earners such as compositors, enamellers and potters and low wage earners such as book binders, cork cutters and button makers.
We next compare Campbell's quantitative data on apprenticeship premiums, journeymen wages, and setting up costs to information from other available sources on these variables. The qualitative variables describing the conditions of employment and prior requirements of various trades that appear in the The London Tradesman have no counterparts in other systematic sources, as far as we know.
Premiums
Campbell's data on premiums, in pounds sterling, are collected in a summary table over several pages at the end of the book (pp. 331-340). We compare it to data from the payment register of the Board of Stamps. In 1710, after the introduction of a stamp duty payment on private indentures of apprenticeship, records of the duty paid on apprenticeship premiums were kept, with stamp tax registers recording indentures upon which duty had been paid running to the first decade of the nineteenth century.
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As Campbell's observations refer to 1747 we limit our attention to tax register entries referring to premiums paid for apprenticeships in London between 1735 and 1755.
Matching trade definitions in the stamp tax register to Campbell's trade classification, we regress individual premiums on a constant with random trade effects. Figure 1 presents point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for each of 28 trades for which the tax register has at least 20 observations in the relevant period, along with the midpoint of Campbell's reported range of premium values. In all but three of these trades Campbell's midpoint is within this confidence interval, and in roughly twothirds Campbell's midpoint is close to the point estimate; in all cases Campbell's range of values (not shown on Figure 1 ) intersects the confidence interval derived from the stamp tax data. We take this as an indication of a high level of consistency 12 The stamp tax registers are available on microfilm at the National Archives, Kew, in London under Series IR 1. In the early years of the twentieth century the Society of Genealogists compiled an index of these records for the period 1710-1774, recording in each case the date of apprenticeship, the name, location and trade of the master, the name and location of the apprentice, and the premiums paid. We use a stratified 14.3% sample dawn from this index comprising 50,200 entries. See Feldman and van der Beek (2013) for further details. Several important studies have sought to trace the wage and price history of England from medieval times to the present. However data on the eighteenth century are scattered and scarce. Alternative sources from this period exist for building trades, compositors and shipwrights. A summary of the comparison of wages in these trades from different sources is presented in Table 2 . Campbell, in 1747, reports a mid-point of 21s for compositors' weekly wages, and that a ship's carpenter earns 18-20s a week in the dock yard, and a bolt and anchor smith "a guinea a week and upwards."
We conclude that Campbell's observations on journeymen wages are consistent with from the limited information available from other sources on the period.
Setting-up costs and other circumstances of the master's trade
Setting up independently as a master required a considerable amount of capital, which usually implied dependence on credit. Interestingly, this cost seems to have played an 14 Bowley and Wood (1899, important role in determining the premium charged by masters, mainly through its implications on his training costs. The requirements that he refers to most often-as present or absent-are physical strength, education and ingenuity. They provide an indication of the length of training required for an apprentice to become productive and cover the expenses he incurs to the master. We posit that in occupations that required strength apprentices became productive in a relatively short period, allowing masters to accept a lower premium to cover the risk of early departure; and vice versa, apprentices in occupations that required more ingenuity and education took longer to become productive, leading masters to charge a higher premium.
To incorporate these verbal descriptions in our regression analyses, we systematically coded them as indicator variables, one for each characteristic and tested their significance in our regression analysis. As these variables are derived from loosely structured verbal descriptions, we cannot rule out the possibility of unintended omissions, or of intended omissions of characteristics the author saw as self-evident;
and while much of the coding was straightforward there were cases in which we were required to exercise judgment, which others might have decided differently. We therefore view these as less reliable variables than our quantitative variables Trades were coded as requiring ingenuity if so described by Campbell or if described as being ingenious. We take this as a reflection of the complexity of the trade.
Conditions of employment
Unusual conditions of employment may also have had an effect on premium levels.
For example, masters working with expensive materials could demand higher premiums due to costly waste, which was inevitable when inexperienced apprentices learned their trade through trial and error, and due to the danger of theft. Conversely, trades that were known to be hazardous to health might command lower premiums.
In most trades apprentices were bound at the age of fourteen or fifteen, especially where physical fitness was required, but in some trades apprentices could be bound at a younger age. There are twelve trades for which Campbell mentions that an apprentice could be bound before he is fourteen. They have in common that none requires great strength but other than that they vary greatly, from simple brushmaking, which requires neither education, skill nor ingenuity, to complex trades such as watch making, optical instrument making and diamond cutting to which an apprentice may be bound younger than fourteen if he is tolerably acute. Another factor that had an effect on premiums in later periods was whether the apprentice lived in or out during his apprenticeship. Humphries (2011, Ch. 9) finds evidence of living out in later periods but Campbell makes no mention of such a possibility and would appear to discourage any such arrangement, aware as he was of the dangers posed by the city's temptations to a young apprentice's moral well-being.
Estimation
We posit that apprenticeship premiums in a given trade are bounded from above by parents' willingness to pay and bounded from below by masters' anticipated net costs.
Parents' willingness to pay reflects the difference in discounted lifetime income between the wages of a journeyman in the trade and the wages of a common laborer, youth enters into an apprenticeship of seven years on his fourteenth birthday and upon its completion begins working as a journeyman. Typical earnings for journeymen reported by Campbell range between twelve and fifteen shillings a week while a common laborer might earn five to seven shillings. The added earnings of a journeyman thus range between five to ten shillings a week, and assuming as before that both work 46 weeks a year, this comes to between £11 10s and £23 a year.
Assume further that this continues until his fortieth birthday (the calculations are not sensitive to the number of working years as the contribution of later years is heavily discounted). The discounted present value at age 14 of the difference between a journeyman's wages and those of a common laborer under these assumptions is tabulated for several possible combinations in Table 4: 32 The comparison of these sums to the premium levels in Table 1 which range between £10 and £20 for most trades suggests that the rate of discount employed by most parents did not exceed 25% per annum, and may well have been lower if parents were able to capture a share of the surplus between the maximal sum they were willing to pay and the minimal sum masters were willing to accept. Of course, these numbers only reflect the pecuniary advantage of becoming a journeyman, ignoring nonpecuniary advantages such as improved social status and better working conditions were also valued, as they no doubt were in many cases, as well as the advantages of a wider dispersion of employment risk within the family.
32 Let w -w 0 denote the annual difference in income and r the annual discount rate. We calculate the net present value of incremental lifetime earnings at age fourteen as
No doubt, personal rates of discounting future gains varied widely across parents depending on their own personal circumstances, notably their access to capital, and on individual preferences. Nonetheless, these numbers suggest that many parents and their apprenticed children were often able to capture a large share of the surplus generated by apprenticeships, possibly reflecting their greater sensitivity to demands on their liquidity, compared to masters, who would be more sensitive to the moral qualities of the apprentice-whether he is hard-working, honest, reliable, and so onand to his quickness of mind and constitution. This should hold especially where masters are numerous and largely interchangeable to the parent, where competition among masters for apprentices would drive down price to near their expected marginal cost. We find evidence of this in the data in the absence of a significant raw correlation between premiums and wages: only when set-up costs are included in the regression do we find a significant effect of wages on premiums. Summarizing the preceding discussion on the effect of different variables on the level of premiums, we expect variation in premiums across trades to vary positively with set-up costs, whether because they reflect entry barriers limiting competition and allowing masters to capture a larger share of the surplus through higher premiums; or because they reflect the complexity of the trade, which therefore requires a longer period of training before the apprentice is fully productive, raising the cost to the master of early departure; or because such trades are associated with the non-pecuniary benefit of higher social status. We expect journeyman wages to be positively associated with premiums: on the part of the master because they increase the incentive for early departure; and on the part of the parent because they increase the benefit from acquiring the trade. And we test the hypothesis that trades requiring special talents or skills are more complex and therefore take longer to learn and so are associated with higher premiums while those requiring greater physical strength are acquired more quickly and carry non-pecuniary disadvantages, and so should be associated with lower premiums. We estimate the following model across 178 trades:
The dependent variable is the logarithm of apprenticeship premiums in trade i and the independent variables include the logarithm of journeyman wages, setting-up costs (denoted by suc), and a vector of trade characteristics (Z'). The results are presented in
(8)
log ( . We find, as expected, strong significant positive effects of both journeymen's wages and set-up costs on premiums, with estimated elasticities between 0.33 and 0.43 for wages and between .23 and .25 for set-up costs, with all coefficients significant at a p-value of 0.001 or better, and little difference between similarly specified OLS and GLS estimates.
The personal traits and prior skills we tested exhibited the expected signs and mostly significant effects. We found statistically significant and positive effects for ingenuity, reading and writing and drawing skill, a positive but less than significant effect for drawing ability and a significant negative effect for strength. We interpret this as an indication that trades that require higher skills command higher premiums. We also found positive but not significant effects (with p-values greater than one) for trades using expensive materials in which the master might anticipate disproportionate losses due to material waste or theft and for trades in which apprentices were often bound over at an age younger than fourteen, an age at which they might be less productive.
Finally, we found that the advantage of being apprenticed to a trade bound to a liveried company had no effect on the premium.
Conclusions
This paper's main contribution is its demonstration that the supply of apprenticeships and demand for them in eighteenth-century London were responsive to market forces.
This lends support to the view advanced by Humphries (2003 Humphries ( , 2011 and Wallis apprenticeship premiums on journeymen's wages, set-up costs and a vector of tradespecific required personal traits and employment conditions.
We estimate an elasticity of apprenticeship premiums with respect to wages between 0.33 and 0.43 and an elasticity between 0.23 and 0.25 with respect to a master's setup costs. We also find that trades requiring higher skills commanded significantly higher premiums while those requiring physical strength commanded significantly lower premiums; and positive but not significant effects for trades in which materials were expensive and in which apprenticeships commonly commenced at an age younger than fourteen. This is consistent with premium levels that are bound from above by parents' willingness to pay and bound from below by the net expected costs of the apprenticeship to the master, taking into account the possibility of the apprentice prematurely terminating his contract (Minns and Wallis, 2013) .
A second important contribution of the paper is its demonstration that the detailed 
